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ABSTRACT
We consider a “price-committment model” where a single seller
announces prices for some extended period of time. More specifi-
cally, we examine the case of items with a limited shelf-life where
storing an item (before consumption) may carry a cost to a buyer
(or distributor). For example, eggs, milk, or Groupon coupons have
a fixed expiry date, and seasonal goods can suffer a decrease in
value. We show how this setting contrasts with recent results by
Berbeglia et al [4] for items with infinite shelf-life.
We prove tight bounds on the seller’s profits showing how they
relate to the items’ shelf-life. We show, counterintuitively, that in
our limited shelf-life setting, increasing storage costs can some-
times lead to less profit for the seller which cannot happen when
items have unlimited shelf-life. We also provide an algorithm that
calculates optimal prices. Finally, we examine empirically the rela-
tionship between profits and buyer utility as the storage cost and
shelf-life duration change, and observe properties, some of which
are unique to the limited shelf-life setting.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of how to allocate resources to different people (or
agents) when each of them has a different valuation for a given
resource, is one of the most fundamental and well-studied problems
in micro-economics. The most common solution has been to set
anonymous prices (i.e. identical pricing for every agent) and then
agents who value the item above its price buy it, and otherwise
they do not.
In the simple multi-unit one-shot scenario setting (i.e. in which
buyers with a known valuation for the item make their purchasing
decision and leave), finding the optimal price (and hence, the opti-
mal allocation) is a relatively simple optimization problem. How-
ever, adding even a small amount of complexity to the scenario
makes it significantly harder to solve. Such complications include
adding uncertainty about buyers’ valuations [14], multiple vendors
Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2018), M. Dastani, G. Sukthankar, E. André, S. Koenig (eds.), July 10–15, 2018,
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[2, 5], and multiple items [12, 13] (all with various limitations on
the agents’ valuation functions). All these problems have spawned
intense research to explore their respective areas1.
Another such issue that leads to an additional complication of the
basic problem is adding a temporal dimension to the setting. This
means sellers can change their prices over time, and hence buyers
can choose to change their buying decisions from day to day, and
should they find it worthwhile, to store items over time (introducing
the issue of storage cost). Of course, if buyers’ valuations remain
constant over time, and they wish to buy every day, prices will also
remain the same for every day. So the interesting problem involves
buyers whose valuation for items change over time. Naturally, the
seller wishes to find prices which maximize its profit, while the
buyers seek to maximize their own utility (i.e. value at time of
consumption − price at time of purchase − storage cost, for each
item purchased). This is, fundamentally, a Stackelberg game, in
which the seller is the “leader” setting the prices, while the buyers
are the “followers” reacting to current and future prices, by pursuing
a best response strategy. We examine the outcomes of these games,
which are basically the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
games.
We wish to understand optimal seller pricing (as a function of
storage cost and shelf-life duration) and how it impacts the overall
utility of the buyers. While there have been several attempts to
construct such a model (see Section 2), only recently did Berbeglia
et al. [4] suggest a model for indivisible items sold over discrete
time steps, with buyers being able to store items at a given time for
consumption at some later time. The Berbeglia et al. [4] analysis
is greatly assisted by their insightful result showing that there are
seller optimal prices such that buyers will not store items.
We introduce a seemingly small but very natural extension to
this model. Instead of discussing items with an unlimited shelf life,
we discuss items with a limited consumption date. These can be
perishable items, like milk, eggs, or fruit, which lose their value
after several days, and are no longer fit for consumption. Perishable
items aren’t only food items; Groupon coupons, for example, also
have an expiry date and Amazon Web Services (AWS) server rental
periods are another case. A similar family of items that we will
discuss are degradable items, which diminish their value after
several days (though still maintaining some value). Such products
can be seasonal or fashion dependent, like clothing items, which
significantly lose value once out of season or fashion.
Changing the durability of products may seem small, but it
changes the results significantly. The various variables involved
in setting prices are effected in a much more direct manner. For
1From here on, we use a buyer/seller terminology as it is easier to grasp. However,
this applies to many resource allocation problems.
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example, Berbeglia et al.’s [4] simplifying result that buyers will
never be required to use storage under optimal pricing no longer
holds, and therefore much of their analysis is no longer applicable
in our setting. This requires us to explore more directly the effect
of storage cost on prices and the resulting impact on buyer deci-
sions. Changing the duration of items allows further examination
of the inter-connection between prices and purchasing demand,
and how small changes in storage cost or shelf life can cascade into
unexpected changes in buyer utility and profits. Sometimes these
move in tandem (e.g when a seller lowers the price thereby selling
more items to more people, increasing profit and the overall utility
of buyers), while in other problem instances this is not necessarily
the case.
In this work we examine the issues of profit and buyers’ utilities
as a function of storage cost and shelf-life both theoretically and
empirically. In Section 4 we show a precise relationship between
the shelf-life of an item and the seller’s profit, both for perishable
and degradable items. In Section 5 we provide an algorithm for
setting prices optimally. Finally, in Section 6, we examine price
and social welfare empirically using simulations (with respect to
realistic distributions on buyer valuations). We show how a limited
shelf-life significantly changes previous results (in Berbeglia et
al. [4]) on the relation between storage costs and profits, including
counterintuitively, that in contrast to infinite shelf life, increasing
the cost of storage does not necessarily induce consumers to accept
higher prices, and can even reduce the profit of the seller.
2 RELATEDWORK
While the topic of limited shelf-life has been examined in different
settings, for example in [9, 15], it has generally treated time and
products as completely divisible. In contrast, we examine these
issues for discrete time and indivisible goods, as is common for
most consumer items. Some work on pricing over time involves
agents looking for the cheapest time to buy a single item [3], while
we examine agents who wish to buy an item each day. The closest
work to ours is Berbeglia et al. [4], in which both pre-announced
pricing as well as contingent pricing2 were studied. They compared
these pricing policies over a finite time period (i.e., there is a known
fixed number of days) for an unlimited supply of an indivisible item
(e.g., digital goods). They proved that for pre-announced pricing
mechanisms with linear (per item unit per day) storage cost and
unlimited storage time, there is an optimal set of prices such that
for these prices, the consumers do not need to store any goods so as
to maximize their utility. They also gave a dynamic program to find
the optimal set of prices to maximize the monopolist’s revenue.
Slightly further afield, Dasu and Tong [8] considered the pricing
problemwhen there is a fixed number of items, goods are perishable
and there is a finite time horizon. Beyond their numerical exper-
iments, they showed that if buyers are not strategic, contingent
pricing dominates pre-announced pricing, but this result does not
hold if consumers are strategic (as they are in our case).
There has been some research about these topics when assuming
there are only two (rather than T ) time periods. Focusing more on
2That is, “threat-based” pricing, in which a seller can announce that if consumers
won’t buy on day t , the price will increase on day t + 1, otherwise it will stay the
same.
pre-announced pricing (as we do), but in a different setting, Correa
et al. [7] proposed a new pre-announced pricing policy, in which
the seller commits to a price menu and dynamically chooses a price
in the menu based on available inventory. They considered a lim-
ited inventory of an item and different arrival times for consumers.
They proved the existence of an equilibrium and they also showed
that under certain conditions their pricing policy outperforms con-
tingent and pre-announced pricing policies.
Aviv and Pazgal [1] studied the pricing problem in another lim-
ited setting, assuming not only 2 time periods, but also assuming
consumer arrival times are drawn from a Poisson distribution. They
compared a pre-announced pricing policy with a contingent one in
which the seller sets the prices based upon the seller’s inventory and
declining consumer valuations. They argued that the monopolist
can increase her revenue up to eight percent in the pre-announced
pricing policy compared to contingent pricing.
Our setting is a particular instance of Stackelberg games, on
which there has is extensive research, though that has been focusing
in the recent past on security games (e.g., [10, 11, 16]).
3 MODEL
We study the problem of pricing where a monopolist tries to sell an
unlimited supply 3 of a certain product or good at times 1, 2, . . . ,T .
She sets the price for time i to pi , being aware of the valuations of
the consumers. She notifies the consumers of the prices for all time
periods before purchases commence (i.e., before t = 1). The number
of units of goods sold at time i is qi . The monopolist’s objective is
to maximize her revenue which is equal to
∑T
i=1 qipi .
On the buyer side, we have one or many self-interested rational
(i.e., wanting to maximize their utilities) consumers with a value
for consuming goods. They can buy on any day and store for con-
sumption on other days. We define the valuation function v(i, t)
with domain N × [T ] for items consumed “fresh” (i.e., that have not
been stored). Their utility is the value of the items they consume
on a given day minus the price they paid for the items and their
storage cost. We assume in the case of a tie, the buyer prefers to
store the goods as little as possible. Following [4] we discuss two
cases regarding the number of consumers and their demands:
Multi-buyers Multiple consumers, each demanding only a
single unit of demand. So on day t , if we sort the consumers’
values for one unit in decreasing order, the consumer’s value
is v(i, t) which is the ith highest value on day t . v(i, t) is
non-increasing in i .
Single-buyer One buyer with many units of demand. In this
setting,v(i, t) represents the consumer’s non-increasingmar-
ginal value for the ith unit of goods on day t . In other words,
v(i, t) is the consumer’s value for i units of goods minus
the value for i − 1 units of the goods, so the total value for
consuming i units on day t is
∑i
j=1v(j, t). We use [4]’s as-
sumption that there is a cap on the number of items desired
by the consumer, i.e., there existsH ∈ N such thatv(H , t) = 0
for all t ∈ T .
3An unlimited supply can be either a digital good (e.g., a newspaper with online
subscription), and moreover, in practice we conceptually think that certain items can
be produced so as to satisfy any demand. For example, in some countries eggs and
milk seem to be in unlimited supply, and in Iceland one can believe that there is an
infinite supply of renewable energy.
In the multi-buyer setting we have N consumers, and in the
single-buyer setting, the maximum demand on any day is N . The
total number of days is T . Consumers may have to pay for storing
the goods and this cost is defined as storage cost. While [4] study
both linear and concave cost, we only study linear storage cost with
cost c per day per unit.
Section 4 begins the study of items with a limited shelf-life, d ,
after which the item loses all value. We extend this model in Section
4.1 where we consider the pricing problem in the setting where
the value of the good when stored becomes a fraction of the initial
value. We define a function r : [T ] → [0, 1]which takes an integer l
which is the number of days that a good is going to be stored before
consumption and returns a fraction r (l) that specifies the value of
the good if consumed l − 1 days after purchase. The function r is
a non-increasing step function. We use this function r to define
another valuation function to represent decreasing values. In the
single-buyer case, let v ′(i, t , l) be the value of consuming the ith
unit on day t , where this unit has been stored l −1 days4. Therefore,
we have v ′(i, t , l) = v(i, t)r (l).
In single-buyer setting, our model is not well-defined yet since
the units that are consumed on a particular day can be bought on
different days, so the value of the consumed items is not clear. The
following immediate observation resolves this definitional issue.
Observation 3.1. In the single-buyer setting, if the buyer has cho-
sen some k specific units for day t ’s consumption that were bought on
different days, the order of consumption of those k items is to consume
those purchased most recently first. So if they are ordered according to
number of days they are stored – d1, . . . ,dk – the consumer’s value
is
∑k
i=1v
′(i, t ,di ).
Proof. To prove this we show that if the consumer buys two
units on different days to consume on the same day, the unit which
is stored longer must have less value. Hence it is considered the
second unit and the other unit is considered the first unit. Let d1
and d2 be the number of days these units are stored and p1 and p2
be the price at which they are bought. We assume d1 is less than
d2 (thus, r (d1) ≥ r (d2); therefore, p2 is less than p1, as otherwise, it
would be more beneficial to buy unit 2 at price p1 and store it d1
days as well. If the consumer’s value for unit 1 is v1 and for unit 2
is v2, we show v1 must be more than v2.
Since the buyer preferred to buy unit 1 when they did (d1 days
ago; price p1), and not buy it d2 days ago at price p2:
r (d1)v1 − p1 > r (d2)v1 − p2
v1 · (r (d1) − r (d2)) > p1 − p2
The buyer also preferred to buy unit 2 when it did (d2 days ago;
price p2), and not buy it d1 days ago at price p1, hence:
r (d1)v2 − p1 < r (d2)v2 − p2
v2 · (r (d1) − r (d2)) < p1 − p2
4In the multi-buyer case, v ′(i, t, l ) is the i th largest value on day t when this unit
has been stored l − 1 days.
Combining these:
v2 · (r (d1) − r (d2)) < v1 · (r (d1) − r (d2))
v2 < v1
□
Practically, in all results the single-buyer and multi-buyer cases
are essentially equivalent, and a single proof suffices for both cases.
We note again that this particular setting is an instance of a
Stackelberg game, which is defined as a 2-stage game, in which a
“leader” announces their strategy and the “followers” respond to it.
A solution to this game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, in
which the leader (e.g. a seller) choses the strategy that will maximize
their profit assuming that followers (e.g. buyers) will best-respond
to it. This is exactly the type of solution we examine here.
4 d-DAY SHELF-LIFE
In this model, a consumer in the single-buyer case or consumers in
the multi-buyer case can only store the goods for less than d days
after which the good is worthless. If d is equal to 1, it means the
goods must be consumed on the same day they are bought. Proofs
are written for the single-buyer case, but can be easily applied to
the multi-buyer one.
Theorem 4.1. The largest possible revenue of the monopolist is
a non-increasing function of d , and in some cases will be strictly
decreasing.
Proof. Let us assume our buyer can store the goods for d days.
We prove that if they can store the goods for d ′ = d − 1 days, the
monopolist can make as much money as in the d-day case.
Assume that the monopolist’s best strategy when the buyer can
store for d days is p1,p2, . . . ,pT . There are two cases regarding the
monopolist’s best strategy. In the first, the monopolist’s prices are
such that although the buyer can store the goods for d days, it is
not beneficial to do so. Hence, if we reduce the duration to d ′, the
monopolist can use the same strategy making the same amount of
money.
The second case is when it is beneficial for the buyer to store
some goods for d days. In this case, we describe a new strategy
p′1,p
′
2, . . . ,p
′
T by which the monopolist makes at least the same
amount of money. Let us assume day s is the last day that our buyer
is going to store one unit of the goods to consume d days later; that
is, to consume on day s + d − 1. As noted before, in the case of a tie
the buyer prefers to store the goods as little as possible. Therefore,
pt > ps + (t − s)c for all s < t ≤ s + d − 1 since otherwise, the
buyer would be better off buying the extra units of goods on day
t to consume on day s + d − 1, instead of day s . The buyer is not
going to store for d days on day s + 1, since s is the last day that the
item is going to be stored for d days. Moreover, now items will be
stored for less than d days on day s + 1 since ps+1 > ps +c as stated
above. Therefore, qs+1 = 0. When the buyer can only store the
goods for d ′ days, if we set p′s+1 = ps + c , the buyer’s behavior, in
terms of purchase, for the days before s do not change at all (since
it is not possible to buy on day s or s + 1 anyway to consume on
previous days, so later prices do not need to be taken into account).
The behavior for the days after s + 1 also does not change because
prices did not change. The only changes are at times s and s + 1
Day: 1 2 3
Consumer valuation 1 1 1000
Optimal price (all cases) 1 1000 1000
Seller profit when storage cost is 0 2 0 1000
Seller profit when storage cost is 2 1 0 1000
Table 1: Example in Theorem 4.3
when the buyer bought on day s and stored for future. Under the
new prices, the item can be bought on day s + 1 instead since p′s+1
is equivalent to ps for the buyer. The amount of the goods does not
change since from buyer’s perspective their utility has not changed
either. Hence, overall, cost of buying and storing the goods has not
changed from the d-day case. □
Corollary 4.2. As a result, the monopolist makes the most money
when the goods must be consumed on the day they are purchased (i.e.,
d = 1).
We begin exploring our limited shelf-life problem by noting that
a significantly useful and simplifying result from [4] (Theorem 3.1)
does not hold in our case. In their setting (i.e., for items with infinite
shelf-life), optimal pricing results in buyers not using storage at all;
that is, buyers consume items on the days they buy them.
Theorem 4.3. There are settings where the monopolist will make
less money as the storage cost is increased. Additionally, in this setting
with limited shelf-life, the best strategy for the monopolist sometimes
makes consumers store the items.
Proof. We give an example of the situation where the monopo-
list makes less money when the storage cost increases, and where
the consumer will always use the storage. In this example, let d = 2
and the cost of storage 0. As shown in Table 1, we assume that
there is a single consumer whose values for one unit of the goods
on days 1, 2 and 3 are 1, 1 and 1000, respectively and for additional
units is 0. Because the largest value is equal to 1000, the best price
for days 2 and 3 must be 1000 to ensure the large payment on day
3. For the first day, best price is 1.
When the storage cost is 0, the consumer will buy two units
on the first day, to consume on days 1 and 2 – unlike the infinite
shelf-life case, storage must be used for optimal case. However,
when the storage cost is 2, the consumer will only buy one unit
on the first day. Hence, the monopolist’s profit is reduced with the
increase in costs. □
Throughout this Section letM be themaximum amount ofmoney
that the monopolist makes when goods are always consumed on
the day of purchase and cannot be stored (i.e. d = 1).
Theorem 4.4. When goods can be stored ford days, the monopolist
makes at least Md amount of money for any
5 linear storage cost
function c .
Proof. We set prices so that themonopolist will make Md amount
of money for any linear cost function and any set of consumer (or
5In fact, this theorem holds for an arbitrary weakly monotonic cost function but we
are only considering linear cost functions in this work.
consumers, in the multi-buyer setting) values. Let p1, . . . ,pT be
the optimal prices when d = 1 and let q1, . . . ,qT be the number
of units purchased on each day. Now, to set the prices, consider
d different pricing options. In each case t (0 < t ≤ d), the goods’
price, on day sd + t for all 0 ≤ s < ⌊Td ⌋ is equal to psd+t and
the goods’ prices for other days are very high (effectively,∞). The
buyer will not store the goods for day sd + t because the prices on
days (s − 1)d + t + 1, (s − 1)d + t + 2, . . . , sd + t − 1 are large numbers
and greater than psd+t . Therefore, the amount bought on day sd + t
will be at least qsd+t . Hence, summing over the d different pricing
schemes, the sum of the revenue in these d cases is more than or
equal toM , so there is at least one of them for which the revenue
for the d-day case is more than or equal to Md . □
That theorem showed a lower bound for the seller’s profit. We
now show this bound is tight:
Theorem 4.5. For any ϵ > 0, there is a setting in which the
monopolist’s maximal revenue is less than (1 + ϵ)Md .
Proof. Choose a natural number a such that 1a−1 < ϵ . At first,
assume T = d , then later, we will complete the proof for T = kd
for k ∈ N. For simplicity, we will assume that c = 06. We now
define b as
∏d
t=1(ad−t+1 − 1). For each day t , 1 ≤ t ≤ d , the buyer
wishes to purchase ad−t items, each with a value of to b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 .
Any additional item has a value of 0.
For themonopolist, it is beneficial to set the price to one of the val-
uations of the buyer, since otherwise, it can increase the price with-
out losing any purchase, so prices are of the set { b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 : 1 ≤ t ≤
d}. Increasing prices as time goes on does not increase the revenue,
since the buyer can buy when prices are lower and store for later,
as storage cost is 0. Since values are going up, reducing the price
does not increase the revenue either. Therefore, the monopolist just
sets a fixed price for all days, which, as noted, should be equal to
some item’s value. So the monopolist’s revenue equals b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 (for
some 0 < t ≤ d) times the number of items with value more than or
equal to the price. I.e., b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 ·
∑d−t
t=0 a
t =
b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 ·
ad−t+1−1
a−1 = b.
In comparison,M =
∑d
t=1
b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 · ad−t . Monopolist revenue in
the d-day case compared toM is:
b∑d
t=1
b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 · ad−t
=
1∑d
t=1
(a−1)
ad−t+1−1 · ad−t
1∑d
t=1
ad−t+1−ad−t
ad−t+1−1
<
1∑d
t=1
ad−t+1−ad−t
ad−t+1
=
1∑d
t=1 1 − 1a
=
1
d − da
=
1
d (1 − 1a )
=
1
d ( a−1a )
( aa−1 )
d
=
(1 + 1a−1 )
d
<
(1 + ϵ )
d
So far we showed that if T = d , the total revenue is less than
(1 + ϵ)Md . In a more general case, we set T = kd which means
we have k blocks of length d . On day t , 1 ≤ t ≤ d in block i ,
0 ≤ i < k , the buyer wants to buy ad−t items, each with a value
of b ·(a−1)
ad−t+1−1b
k−i (and additional items are valued at 0). Therefore,
6For c > 0, by increasing b to an arbitrarily high value, we can make values large
enough, and the difference between each day significant enough, so the behavior is
practically as if c = 0.
the optimal prices in each block i are also multiplied by bk−i . Since
in each block compared to its previous block, prices are lower, the
buyer would not store any goods from the previous block.We define
Mi for 0 ≤ i < k as the maximum achievable revenue for block i
when there is no storage. As proved, in each block i , the maximum
revenue is less (1 + ϵ)Mid . Therefore, in general, the maximum
revenue is also less than (1 + ϵ)Md . □
4.1 d-Day Fractional Value
Generalizing our shelf-life results from the previous Section, instead
of assuming that after d days the goods’ values drops to 0, we
assume that after d days the goods’ value drops to a fraction r (0 ≤
r < 1) of its value when bought. In other words, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and
1 ≤ t ≤ T ,v ′(i, t , l) = v ′(i, t , 1) for l ≤ d andv ′(i, t , l) = r ·v ′(i, t , 1)
for l > d .
The results are, to a large extent, a generalization of the r = 0
case.
Theorem 4.6. In d-day storage with fractional value model, the
monopolist makes at least 1−rd M amount of money.
Theorem 4.7. For all small ϵ > 0 there is a setting with d-day stor-
age with fractional value model in which the monopolist’s maximum
revenue is less than ( 1−rd + ϵ)M .
The proofs for these two theorems are somewhat more com-
plicated than for the corresponding Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, but as
they follow a similar structure we omit the proofs due to space
constraints.
5 FINDING OPTIMAL PRICES IN d-DAY
SHELF-LIFE
Themonopolist’s goal is to maximize revenue, while consumers aim
to maximize utilities. Consequently, when the prices are announced
by the monopolist, the consumers seek the best strategy for them,
which manifests itself in the number of units bought each day and
the number of units consumed each day.
In the multi-buyer setting, each consumer starts from day T and
works backward, trying to find the best day to purchase the unit
that will be consumed on day T . Then the consumer proceeds to
day T − 1, repeating the process, and then moves on to day T − 2
and onwards. We have N consumers and each of them finds their
best strategy in time T 2, so the running time of this algorithm is
T 2N . This same algorithm also works in single-buyer setting. In
single-buyer setting, on each day, for each marginal value greater
than 0, the consumer finds the best day to buy a unit to maximize
the utility separately. Therefore, the running time is T 2 for each
unit, multiplied by the maximal number of units which is N . This
algorithm works for any storage model (d-day storage, more than
d-day storage with fractional values and multi-step value decrease
model which we define later in this paper) and many storage cost
functions beyond the linear we mainly address here.
On the other hand, from the monopolist’s point of view, finding
the best prices is not as easy as finding the best strategy for con-
sumers. In this Section, we deal with finding the best strategy for the
monopolist. We present an algorithm, exponential in d , which finds
the best prices in the d-day storage model in both the single-buyer
and multi-buyer settings.
The next theorem is similar to Theorem 3.2 in [4]. However, as
in our model the best pricing sequence may require storage, the
proof and the theorem are not the same.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an optimal pre-announced pricing se-
quence p1,p2, . . . ,pT such that for each t , we have pt = v(i, s, 1) +
c(t − s) for some 1 ≤ s ≤ T and some 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Proof. The difference between this theorem and theorem 3.2
in [4] is that here, 1 ≤ s ≤ T whereas in [4] 1 ≤ s ≤ t . Notice
that here, t − s can be negative, in which case the price for day t
is equal to v(i, s, 1) minus storage cost. To prove this theorem, we
set v(0, t , 1) = L for all t ∈ [T ] where L is a large number. We make
this assumption because on days that nothing is sold, we set prices
to L.
Let us assume {p1,p2, . . . ,pT } is the set of optimal prices and if
there are several optimal sets of prices, choose one set arbitrarily.
Take the smallest t such that pt , v(i, s, 1) + (t − s) · c for any
1 ≤ s ≤ T and any 1 ≤ i ≤ N . If qt = 0, then set p′t = v(0, t , 1) = L.
Clearly, the consumers still do not buy anything on day t because
the price on this day is a large number and consumers’ behaviour on
other days does not change either. Therefore, themonopolist did not
lose any money by this change. If qt > 0, set p′t = min{v(j, s, 1) +
(t −s) ·c : 1 ≤ s ≤ T ; 1 ≤ j ≤ N ;v(j, s, 1)+ (t −s) ·c > pt }. If qt > 0,
then p′t is well-defined because v(j ′, s ′, 1) + (t − s ′)c ≥ pt for some
1 ≤ j ′ ≤ N and 1 ≤ s ′ ≤ T in order to have qt > 0. Now we are
going to prove why this new set of prices is more profitable. On
any day t ′ < t , the consumers will buy those units of goods they
bought previously since the prices did not change on these days
and future prices are either increasing or staying the same. On any
day t ′ > t , again the consumers will buy those units of goods they
bought previously since additional purchases on day t for future
consumption are not beneficial.
We only need to study what happens on day t . With our optimal
prices, consumers bought qt units on day t . These qt units were
consumed on different days, among all of these units, consider
the one which had the least value for consumers. Let us say this
value is the value of the kth unit on day t ′, v(k, t ′, 1). So we have
pt + c · (t ′ − t) ≤ v(k, t ′, 1), but because pt , v(i, s, 1) + (t − s) · c
for any 1 ≤ s ≤ T and any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have pt < v(k, t ′, 1).
We know v(k, t ′, 1) + c · (t − t ′) belongs to {v(j, s, 1) + (t − s) · c :
1 ≤ s ≤ T ; 0 ≤ j ≤ N ;v(j, s, 1) + (t − s) · c > pt }, so the new
price p′t which is the minimum value of the set is less than or equal
to v(k, t ′, 1) + c · (t − t ′). Therefore, the consumer still affords to
buy those units of goods, but they may prefer to buy them on
other days rather than day t . These other days cannot be any day
before day t because we assumed that day t was the first day that
pt , v(i, s, 1)+ (t −s) ·c for any 1 ≤ s ≤ T and any 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Thus,
prices on all previous days are in that form and p′t is minimum
value of the prices in that form. As a result, the consumers do not
prefer to buy those units of goods on earlier days. It is possible that
consumers buy those units on days after day t . In this case, the
amount of money that consumers are paying is more than or equal
to previous amount since previously, they preferred to buy on day
t . Besides, they are storing for fewer days; therefore, the amount of
money the monopolist makes is more than or equal to the previous
amount. In conclusion, the monopolist does not lose any money by
this change. □
In order to give a dynamic program to find the optimal prices
in the d-day storage model, we need some definitions. First, we
defineCt which is the set of possible prices considering only future
prices at time t and C ′t which is the set of all possible prices. Ct =
{v(j, s, 1) + (t − s) · c |t ≤ s ≤ T , 0 ≤ j ≤ N } and C ′t = {v(j, s, 1) +
(t − s) · c |1 ≤ s ≤ T , 0 ≤ j ≤ N }. Next, we define price p′t to be the
price the monopolist sells the goods that consumers are going to
consume on day t ; it can be sold on any day up to and including day
t . Now we define cost p′′t to be the total cost that consumers have
paid for the goods to be consumed on day t , i.e., purchase price +
cost of storage.
We need to define additional functions: p′′t (x1,x2, . . . ,xd ) takes
prices x1, . . . ,xd which are prices on days t −d + 1, t −d + 2, . . . , t
and returns the lowest cost for the buyer (that is, including storage
cost) to buy item for day t . We also use arдmintp′′t (x1, . . . ,xd ) to
return the index of the day with the lowest cost considering storage
cost for day t . Note that p′t = xarдmintp′′t (x1,x2, ...,xd ). Finally, we
define q′t (x1,x2, . . . ,xd ) which is the number of units of goods
which consumers will buy to consume on day t , it can be purchased
on any day up to and including day t , q′t (x1,x2, . . . ,xd ) = |{j ≥ 1 :
vj,t ≥ p′′t (x1,x2, . . . ,xd )}|
Theorem 5.2. The dynamic program (algorithm 1) finds the opti-
mal prices.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Prices in d-day Model
1: R(T + 1, x1, x2, . . . , xd−1) ← 0 for all x1, . . . , xd−1 ∈ (
T⋃
t=1
C′t )d−1
2: for t = T → d do
3: for all x1, x2, . . . , xd−1 ∈ C′t−d+1 ×C′t−d+2 × . . . , C′t−1 do
4: R(t, x1, . . . , xd−1) ←
max{q′t (x1, . . . , xd−1, xd )p′t (x1, . . . , xd−1, xd ) + R(t +
1, x2, x3, . . . , xd ) : xd ∈ Ct ∪ {xi + (d − i)c, 1 ≤ i ≤ d }}
5: S (t, x1, x2, . . . , xd−1) ←
arдmaxxd {q′t (x1, . . . , xd−1, xd )p′t (x1, . . . , xd−1, xd ) + R(t +
1, x2, x3, . . . , xd ) : xd ∈ Ct ∪ {xi + (d − i)c, 1 ≤ i ≤ d }}
6: end for
7: end for
8: x⋆1 , x
⋆
2 , . . . , x
⋆
d−1 ← arдmaxx1, . . .,xd−1 {R(d, x1, x2, . . . , xd−1) :
x1, x2, . . . , xd−1 ∈ C′1 ×C′2 × . . . ×C′d−1 }
9: for t = d → T do
10: x⋆t ← S (t, x⋆t−d+1, x⋆t−d+2, . . . , x⋆t−1)
11: end for
return x⋆1 , x
⋆
2 , . . . , x
⋆
T
Sketch of proof. R(t ,x1, . . . ,xd−1) computes the optimal rev-
enue that the monopolist can earn from day t to day T given that
x1, . . . ,xd−1 are prices on d −1 previous days. This is done by back-
wards induction. First, we have R(T +1,x1,x2, . . . ,xd−1) to zero for
any x1, . . . ,xd−1 and second, in the for loop when t = T , it finds
R(T ,x1, . . . ,xd−1) for any given x1, . . . ,xd−1 by going through all
possible prices using xd variable for day T . The algorithm checks
howmany units consumer will buy to consume on dayT with given
prices x1, . . . ,xd by calculating q′t (x1, . . . ,xd−1,xd ) and then com-
putes how much the monopolist will earn per unit by calculating
p′t (x1, . . . ,xd−1,xd ); thus, taking the max of their multiplication is
the maximum total amount of money that the monopolist makes
for day T consumption. We keep the knowledge of the price we
chose using S .
For the induction step, for any dayk and any possiblex1, . . . ,xd−1,
we assume that we computed R(t ,x1, . . . ,xd−1) for all days k <
t ≤ T , then given x1, . . . ,xd−1, we compute the obtainable revenue
from day t to T for all possible xd . Then we find the maximum of
these values as R(k,x1, . . . ,xd−1).
Finally, we compute the best prices for firstd−1 days, by checking
all possible prices for those days and computing the maximum rev-
enue. Therefore, by using first d −1 prices and S(t ,x1,x2, . . . ,xd−1)
we can find the optimal prices for all days. □
Observation 5.3. The running time of the dynamic program is
O((NT )ddT ).
6 EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF d-DAY
SHELF-LIFE
We designed a set of simulations so as to more carefully examine the
connections between prices, buyers’ utilities, storage costs and shelf
life. As we wish to understand these relations in realistic settings,
we chose buyer valuation functions corresponding to a consumer
product. We did this by first choosing for each buyer i their “base
value” vi for one unit of an item (e.g., how much does one like
apples), using a normal distribution with a fairly large variance (we
used one with mean 30 and variance 10). However, if each buyer’s
valuation was fixed the pricing problem would simply be a matter
of finding the optimal price for a single day. Hence, as in real life,
one’s daily valuation is close to, but not exactly, their “base value”
but not exactly it (e.g., some days one can be busier, without time for
a snack). Therefore, we specify a buyers’ valuation distribution as
a normal distribution with its mean being its base value, vi , and its
variance being either 5 or 2 (we chose to see the different behavior
when valuations change more or less significantly each day). We
ran this experiment with N = 5 buyers and time-horizon T = 20.
What is the impact of rising storage costs on prices, profit and
utility? The seller can respond to rising storage cost by increasing
or decreasing prices (or not respond at all) so as to obtain optimal
revenue. Increasing prices can benefit profit in an obviousway if one
does not drive out too many buyers on any given day. Decreasing
prices can result in more profit by allowing more buyers to make
a purchase if the increased participation offsets the lower prices.
We recall the critical observation in Berbeglia et al. [4] that there
is no need for storage with optimal prices when there is unlimited
shelf-life. Hence, it follows that increasing storage costs cannot
decrease profit in the unlimited shelf-life model, since any
buyer who did not store before (even at cost 0) will surely not want
to store at a higher storage cost. This allows the seller to increase
or decrease prices so as to achieve optimal revenue by determining
the tradeoff between the increase in price per item sold to buyers
who continue to buy and the loss due to buyers who will not buy
on a given day.
However, as shown by Theorem 4.3 and illustrated in Table 1, in
the limited shelf-life model, storage is sometimes necessary,
and profits can actually decrease when storage costs rise. To
what extent does this happen in the reasonably realistic scenario
given by our distribution on buyer values? Clearly, the smaller the
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Figure 1: Effects on profit when changing storage cost, with different graphs according to shelf-life duration and variance of
distribution from which utility valuations were taken (“Ber”’ indicates [4]’s model of infinite shelf-life).
variation in each buyers valuation, the closer we are to simple iden-
tical pricing for every day without any anomalies and conversely,
we may expect that pricing becomes more subtle as the variation
increases. Similarly, the longer the shelf-life duration d , the closer
we are the unlimited shelf-life model.
Figure 1 demonstrates the impact of rising storage costs on the
sellers optimal revenue. Note the various graphs with variance 2
are always above their equivalent with variance 5. We observe that
the two curves (for variance 2 and 5) for unlimited shelf-life are
indeed monotonically increasing with cost. In contrast, even for
small variance, the curves for limited duration are not monotonic
and that this phenomena is more accentuated with higher variance
although the curves do becomemonotonic as the duration increases.
Figure 3 considers the overall utility of the buyers (i.e. the sum
of utilities for each item unit sold) as a function of storage cost. We
note that in the effects of rising costs described above, only the one
lowering prices has the possibility of increasing the overall utility
while increasing profitability. In order for this to happen, there
needs to be more than a small difference between the valuations
in different days, and the longer the shelf-life, the larger is the
seller’s concern that one could buy the item when it’s cheap and
save it. Hence, the longer the shelf-life, the storage cost needs to be
higher, so it would not be beneficial for a buyer to buy and store. For
the higher variance this subtle interplay is apparent in the figure.
Considering both Figures 1 and 3, we can see that for duration
d = 4, increasing the storage cost from 0 to 1 illustrates that both
the profit and overall utility can decrease. Note also that higher
shelf life duration will allow the buyer to store more often but the
cost of storage tends to lower the overall utility.
The differing variation of the buyers’ utility from day to day
has, as is to be expected, a significant effect on the observed phe-
nomenon. When the variation is smaller, it can be approximated by
the case where the valuations are the same, which are far easier to
analyze (since prices stay fixed throughout). Indeed, as can be seen
in Figure 2, for the low variance case, a higher storage cost goes
hand in hand with lower buyers’ utility, an effect which becomes
more accentuated with the shelf-life duration. However, when the
variance is higher, this clean and orderly structure disappears. As
we have observed before, unlike [4]’s model, higher storage costs
are not necessarily linked with lower utility, and this effect is clearer
when the shelf-life is shorter; the longer it gets, the closer it resem-
bles [4]’s model, in which the shelf-life isT . In particular for shorter
shelf-life, the interaction between prices and storage costs is quite
intricate, resulting in increased profits for the seller, for whom the
storage costs are a guarantee that a lower price on a certain day
would not “propagate” to future days.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We first studied the d-day shelf-life pricing problem (when items
perish ind days), and then we extended the model so that an item re-
tains a fraction of its value after d-days. We proved tight bounds on
the seller’s profits in these models, which show the profit decreases
linearly as the shelf life grows. For the d-day shelf-life model we
gave an algorithm (polynomial time in N and T but exponential in
the shelf life d) to calculate optimal prices. One immediate question
is whether or not this exponential dependence on the shelf -life d is
necessary. While for many perishable food items one would expect
d to be relatively small (i.e., relative to the overall time frame T for
which decisions are being made), but in other applications, d might
be quite large.
As noted in the introduction, optimal pricing calculations are,
de-facto, finding an allocation mechanism that can be applied in
various settings of limited resources, and our time-sensitive setting
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Figure 2: Effects on overall buyers’ utility when shelf-life duration increases (until it is T , which are the results for [4]), with
different storage costs and variance of distribution from which utility valuations were taken.
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has applications beyond rotten eggs and out-of-fashion clothing
items. For example, cloud services – the usage of which is growing
significantly – are commonly priced so that users pay for a set of
resources they can only use for a limited time, which is exactly a
limited shelf-life product.
There aremanyways to continue and expand this line of research.
Our setting did not include the presence of consumer budgets, that
is, an overall limit on the expenditure buyers can afford throughout
the whole period T . This is an issue not only in our setting, but
also in Berbeglia et al. [4]. While we have some preliminary results
in this regard (namely a quadratic programming algorithm), the
presence of budgets leads to a substantially more complex pricing
problem, as was shown in different settings to which budgets were
added (e.g., [5]). Naturally, budget considerations will come into
play even more significantly when extending the model to consider
prices for multiple distinct items with one or multiple sellers. If
there is no budget then item pricing may be considered as separate
sales; but with budgets, to what extent would item prices be related?
A further extension of the d-day fractional model is to allow
an item’s value to decrease gradually, so that after dk days (for
k = 1, . . . , t ), the value of the item decreases to a fraction rk of
its initial value until it eventually (after some dt+1 days) loses all
value. An obvious (but mistaken) approach to this would be to
assume Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 can easily be nested. This does not
work, since buyers can always buy a completely new item, and
while we hypothesize the outcome will be a linear relation between
rk and the profits, it requires a different approach than the one
used here. Another fundamental change is moving to an adaptive
pricing model; namely, instead of pre-announcing prices, how will
the market behave when the seller changes prices dynamically as
discussed in Berbeglia et al. [4].
Finally, an additional topic of consideration – not only for our
model, but for [4] and others as well – is one of information. Our
scenario assumes a full information setting where the seller knows
the valuations of buyers for each day. What should a seller do in
the Bayesian setting where the daily valuations are drawn from a
known distribution? Taking the expected valuation for each day is,
of course, not a valid solution (the pricing for an agent that has a
value of 2 or 0 is very different than for agent with value 1). This
problem can be seen as a type of Bayesian Stackelberg game (with
each set of valuations considered as a type of “follower”). However,
in general, finding the optimal strategy in such games is known
to be be NP-hard [6]. But our particular structure (with a known
distribution for each day’s value), may allow for better results.
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